PRIMARY RESEARCH

My primary areas of research concern the connections between the phenomenal character and the representational contents of perceptual experience as well as the bearing of various empirical results on these issues.  More specific projects focus on:

• the structure of phenomenal consciousness

• phenomenal schematics: the claim that the phenomenal structure of a perceptual experience constrains without fully determining the possible representational contents of that experience

• using minor variations on classic thought experiments about phenomenal consciousness to show that our intuitions are far more equivocal in supporting anti-physicalism than they would at first appear

• using the Helmholtzian paradigm in perceptual psychology as well as more specific research in biological motion perception and the perception of animacy to address debates over the admissible contents of perceptual experience

• the metaphysics and ethics of sensory disability and sensory substitution systems

• the disunity of representational function in central and peripheral vision

WITHIN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE

• the relevance of recent work on complexity and modeling in the philosophy of science in thinking about ontological commitment to a language of thought

• pluralism about the mechanisms of causal judgement

• Bayesian models of perceptual processing 

• The global neuronal workspace hypothesis

MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY

• the role of implicit bias in the diagnosis and treatment of chronic pain and psychiatric illness

• the nature of  disability

• the bearing of delusions on our understanding of the systematicity and compositionality of thought

MISCELLANEOUS

• the use of schematic generality in understanding our commitments to logical truths across possible expansions of our languages

• The learnability of logic